



18 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : (1) The Executive Director/Comptroller
(2) The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Establishment of a Related Activities Center
Under the DCI's Vietnamese Affairs Staff in
Conjunction with the CIA Operations Center

1. During the past year the DCI's Vietnamese Affairs Staff (VAS) has handled and retained an ever-increasing amount of all-source information, not only on Vietnam but also on activities in Cambodia, Laos, South China and Thailand which bear on the Vietnamese struggle. As you are aware, one of the responsibilities we have acquired is that of maintaining the DCI Data Book, a compendium of current information established so that senior officers of this Agency needing current facts and figures on any aspect of the Vietnam struggle (e. g., to reply to Congressional or other high level inquiries) could promptly obtain any data needed in one place. It has become increasingly obvious, however, that files and notebooks alone are not adequate as conceptual or presentational devices to give anyone a clear picture of the total Vietnam situation in all its complex aspects. It has also become increasingly obvious that there is a real need for some mechanism for projecting this total picture, both to support and assist the analytic and line production components of the Agency concerned with Vietnam and as a management tool for those line components with Vietnam-related operational responsibilities.

2. After a good deal of thought and a review of various possible solutions to what has become an increasingly critical problem, I feel that the Director's and the Agency's needs would be best served by the establishment of a physical facility to be called the Related Activities Center (RAC) which

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would display graphically by maps, charts, graphs, and other means a comprehensive, current projection of the total situation in Vietnam and adjacent areas -- i. e., a total picture of all activities impinging on the Vietnam war. This facility, manned primarily by VAS personnel (see para 4 below) would enable us to take the staggering amount of information and intelligence on Vietnam flowing into the Agency, reduce it to meaningful, correlated, and collated form, and display it in a manner all Agency components concerned with Vietnam could use. (Attachment "A" lists the source inputs that would be utilized and Attachment "B", the information to be displayed.)

3. The establishment of the RAC has been discussed with the DDI, the DDP and the A/DDS&T and their subordinate components immediately concerned with Vietnam. Our specific proposal has been coordinated with and endorsed by Mr. R.J. Smith, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Colby, Mr. Duckett and Mr. Warfield. We have found general support for this concept and a general belief that the RAC would be something complementary to present activity on Vietnam rather than any form of competition or additional bureaucratic layering. We do not envisage VAS/RAC as an additional production office or command center, but as an analytic and management tool that all line components concerned with Vietnam could and would use in the execution of their respective responsibilities.

4. In particular, the RAC would complement the activities of the CIA Operations Center, with which the RAC would obviously maintain close and constant liaison. Actually, Mr. Smith and I believe that in terms of total Agency interests, the optimum relationship between the RAC and the Operations Center would be more that of a joint venture than that of simple liaison, with the RAC serving as an extension of the Operations Center as well as a component of the VAS. As Mr. Smith and I envisage the relationship, the Operations Center would assist in manning the RAC, the two would be mutually supporting, and the facilities of the RAC would always be available to the Operations Center in the event of a particular Vietnam crisis requiring a round-the-clock current intelligence watch.

5. The ideal location for the RAC is one of the OSI/DDS&T conference rooms adjacent to the DCI/VAS offices (room number 6F25; sketch is enclosed as Attachment "C"). This room could easily be made SI secure by sealing the corridor entrances; access would be possible only through the VAS main

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office. For the last few months, we have studied our space needs carefully and even with the maximum degree of compression by use of sliding panels, fold-outs, vu-graphs, etc., the specific space requested (room number 6F25) is the minimum needed to establish an effective Center. This particular space has the additional advantage of being both immediately adjacent to our offices and immediately below the CIA Operations Center; thus its physical location would facilitate implementation of the relationship described above.

6. Mr. Duckett is aware of our request for this room and recognizes its desirability in terms of our needs and requirements. He also has a requirement for conference space, however, which is presently being met by the room in question. Thus, his endorsement of the RAC concept should not be construed as DDS&T endorsement of our request for this particular space. What we have is a space problem which we hope can be resolved in the best interests of the Agency and to the mutual satisfaction of all parties concerned. The DDS advises that he cannot promise a replacement of this space to the DDS&T until much later in the year.

25X1 7. In developing the physical attributes and requirements of the RAC, we have worked closely with [] the Staff Architect. We have design and layout sketches available for inspection if you should care to examine
25X1 them. [] has also worked closely with us in developing our cost estimates. Our joint estimate is that the renovation work and new equipment required for the RAC would cost a total of [] (A breakout of this estimate is given in Attachment "D".) My current (FY 1967) budget has sufficient funds to cover the costs involved, funds which I programmed into the budget for just this purpose.

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8. The Related Activities Center is not a new idea, indeed I mentioned it to you during our lunch last summer. Further study and analysis during the past months have, in my mind, made the need ever more apparent. Such a Center, for example, would be the optimum locale in which to hold the kind of briefing we were called upon to provide on short notice on 14 April when Secretary McNamara asked to come over to the Agency to discuss Vietnam. In short, the RAC would be something that does not now exist anywhere in the Agency (or, so far as I can discover, in Washington), would

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compete with no present Agency activity, would be of service to all Agency components with Vietnam responsibilities, and hence, would enhance the Agency's total Vietnam effort. I, therefore, request your approval to proceed with the construction and establishment of this Center.

[Redacted Signature]

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George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachments

CONCURRENCES:

Executive Director/Comptroller

Date

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Date

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